Much as Mets fans might not like to admit it, the Philadelphia Phillies have now won two NL East titles in a row (not to mention that World Championship a month back). While hardly one of Atlanta-esque proportions, a streak is a streak, and it does deserve at least a little bit of respect.
Not too much, though. After all, over the course of two seasons the Phillies have been a grand total of four games better—in the grand scheme of things, two games a season is nothing. There is a lot of luck involved in winning a division two years running by that slim a margin; it’s not difficult to imagine things breaking a little differently. A freak injury here and there, a bad bounce at an inopportune moment, hitting a hot team at the wrong moment. There are lots of things that regularly go wrong, and I could certainly see an argument purporting adverse effects on the Mets.
But does the fact that luck may be all that’s elevating the Phillies over the Mets mean there’s nothing to be learned from them? Of course not. There are lessons even in losing teams, and not all negative ones, either. Teams accumulate their wins in different ways; some teams may use a potent offense, while others might focus on strong pitching with great defense up the middle. Even if the Mets and Phillies finished the season with identical records, there would still be a different method or framework lying underneath. I suppose an alternative title for this article could be “The Phillies: How They Did It.”
For instance, if I were to take anything gleaned from the Braves’ dynasty to heart it would be these two items: never underestimate the importance of roster depth, and great coaching can help you make the most of lesser talent.
So here are a few things the Phillies did right, in no particular order:
1. Don’t be afraid to build your pitching staff around your bullpen in this day and age.
The Phillies made shoring up the top of their bullpen a priority during the offseason, and the move paid big dividends. They paid a reduced price—Michael Bourn, Geoff Geary, and Mike Costanzo—for Brad Lidge, who was coming off a couple of bad seasons where his command seemed to desert him. Many questioned his poise and ability to pitch in clutch situations, but Phillies GM Pat Gillick trusted his stuff, peripheral numbers, and track record instead. Lidge, of course, had a perfect season, not blowing a single save all season and post-season long.
But the entire Phillies pen was phenomenal, not just Lidge. Ryan Madson has been a stalwart there for years, and his ability to pitch multiple innings is invaluable. Chad Durbin was the perfect guy to try out there: a two-pitch pitcher with solid minor league numbers who was stretched as a starter. I had mocked the J.C. Romero signing before the season, but it turned out to be an excellent move, as Romero was one of the league’s better LOOGYs. Clay Condrey was capable again also.
Three of the Phillies’ starters performed poorly or well below expectations: Brett Myers, Adam Eaton, and Kyle Kendrick. But the Phillies didn’t completely self-distruct because, in large part, of the NL’s best relief corps.
2. Platoons can be your friend, even when they don’t work.
I’m always surprised more teams don’t embrace the platoon. I firmly believe talent is easier to find when players are put in situations where they’re more likely to succeed. Davey Johnson was a big believer in this, often running three or four platoons a season. And they don’t even have to be applied in traditional ways, either. Someday a team will get even more creative and start platooning guys based on defense—use the better infielder when a groundball pitcher is on the mound—or on more specific hitting tendencies.
The Phillies decided to use one in right field this season, consisting of Jayson Werth and Geoff Jenkins. I thought the move was brilliant. By pairing up a lefty-mashing righty like Werth (.291/.374/.545 for his career) with Jenkins, who hits righties to the tune of .286/.354/.516, the Phillies found a way to get All-Star level production from two guys who weren’t actually All-Star caliber while simultaneously strengthening the bench.
But there was a problem: Jenkins didn’t hit. The Phillies did a fantastic job limiting his plate appearances against lefties to just 25, but he wound up batting a mere .256/.313/.415. Still, the platoon more or less held it’s own, thanks to Werth, who managed to hit .255/.360/.407 against righties, while doing his usual thing to southpaws. The nice part about platoons is that all your eggs aren’t in one basket. If one guy who falls apart, you always have the other guy to turn to; with a little bit of luck, he might pick up some of the slack, which is just what Jayson Werth did in 2008.
3. It’s nice to have a decent Plan B.
Before the season, I was bullish on catcher Carlos Ruiz. He had a nice glove, and he hit a pretty respectable .259/.340/.396 as a 28-year-old catcher. He had a nice approach at the plate and a line-drive swing which I thought might provide just enough offense to make him a solid contributor overall. Instead, Ruiz completely fell apart at the plate, managing just a .219/.320/.300 line.
Often, a team would be unable to replace a player at a premium defensive position. But the Phillies had Chris Coste backing up, who hit .263/.325/.423 in 274 at-bats. Those numbers aren’t great, but they’re not Carlos Ruiz numbers either, and there’s a lot of value in being able to turn a grade ‘F’ into a ‘C.’
Similarly, Pedro Feliz was brought in chiefly for his defense, but he really didn’t do nearly enough offensively to justify a starting job. While Feliz never truly lost his job, the Phillies did have Greg Dobbs, who helped carry some of the burden by hitting .301/.333/.491. Not only do these guys provide insurance in case someone goes down or disappoints, but they also fortify the bench.
4. Make those early-round draft picks count.
Since taking over as Philadelphia’s scouting director in October of 1992, here’s a list of some guys former Phillies scouting director Mike Arbuckle drafted: Wayne Gomes (1st, 1993), Scott Rolen (2nd, 1993), Marlon Anderson (2nd, 1995), Adam Eaton (1st, 1996), Jimmy Rollins (2nd, 1996), J.D. Drew (1st, 1997), Randy Wolf (2nd, 1997), Derrick Turnbow (5th, 1997), Pat Burrell (1st, 1998), Brett Myers (1st, 1999), Chase Utley (1st, 2000), Gavin Floyd (1st, 2001), Ryan Howard (5th, 2001), and Cole Hamels (1st, 2002).
While some of those picks are certainly better than others, Arbuckle always did a tremendous job targeting talent at the top of his drafts and making them count. I doubt there’s another scouting director who has managed to correctly identify impact players as consistently as Arbuckle, who recently departed for Kansas City after being passed over for the Phillies’ GM vacancy. I won’t say it was a poor decision—sometimes great scouts really are better served in smaller roles, and who knows if Arbuckle has the administrative skills—but I do think they’ll miss him.
Alex is a raving lunatic whose work can be found regularly here at Mets Geek. He welcomes comments and criticisms at kingblackfish@yahoo.com.
This isn’t new — see the 1996 N.Y. Yankees. I don’t think any of those starters pitched more than 6 innings in the entire post season
“Many questioned” him? Virtually ALL of baseball had written off Lidge.
Gillick was either a sheer genius or hit baseball lotto when he made that trade.
IMHO, Lidge - not Howard, Utley, Rollins or Victorino - was the difference maker for the Phils in 08.
BTW, this is a very good and very fair assessment.
Excellent job here, Alex.
Not new but often overlooked. People have a tendency to wildly overrate starting pitching’s effect on the game.
Loved the article, Alex, but I especially loved this point. The Mets offense became a lot more inconsistent down the stretch last year when Manuel abandoned his corner OF platoons and decided Church was an everyday player, when he clearly wasn’t ready to hit lefties like he had earlier in the year. The Mets would be best served to platoon both corner OF positions next year as well. And like you wrote, if one end of the platoon tanks, hope the other guy picks it up.
fuck this shit
That stretch of draft picks by the Phillies is pretty remarkable. Gotta feel for the guy, getting passed over for the GM job. Everyone was quick to credit Pat Gillick for the Phillies’ success (and he deserves his fair share of credit), but the the Phillies’ “core” was Arbuckle’s creation.
Now how can you argue with that kind of logic?
Yes and no.
When Schilling and Johnson were pitching in Arizona, they were near unbeatable in the post-season.
Great starting pitching is better and more important than a great bullpen.
However, a great bullpen is a lot easier and cheaper to assemble than great starting pitching.
I mean, I would take Santana, CC, Peavy, Beckett and a handful of other starters before I would take the best reliever in baseball
This is a good article, Alex — not meaning to demean it.
I just think people value what just won — when Arizona and Florida won; need great starting pitching; when the 96 Yanks or the 08 Phillies, need great bullpens.
Happens all the time in all sports — hence the dramatic increase in the 3-4 defense since 2001
I’m sorry, but no one questioned the Lidge move. It was a low risk, low cost, high upside move that allowed Myers to move back into the rotation and get a stronger closer into the bullpen. It was a perfect move. Jessica, Eric, and I bemoaned the move when it was made. I even said that move, by itself might make the difference in the season. I ended up being right unfortunately.
Then it comes out toward the end of the season that Wade handed Lidge to the Phillies for nothing and didn’t even offer him to other teams. Omar didn’t even know he was available.
What Future said. People knew the Phils were getting a big discount.
God, I hate the Phillies.
Nice article. I don’t think that Lidge is a “lesson learned”. No one, not even Lidge, could have predicted that he would be that good. Even had he just been exceptionally good, Mets would have won the pennant. He was perfect.
The Phillies’ story emphasizes that Mets draft picks (when they have draft picks not forfeited by signing geriatric free agents) are not good ones or they don’t have the right guys in the farm system to properly develop them.
The greatest lesson to be learned, not necessarily from the Phillies, is that if you have a ton of players 35 or older on your roster, you are probably going to fall apart. Omar is still probably eyeing Sammy Sosa.