On September 30th, Tom Glavine started the biggest game of the year for the Mets, a must-win for the Mets to have a real prayer at making the playoffs. And Tom Glavine proceeded to pitch the worst outing of his career, an affair where he gave up seven runs while recording just one out, effectively killing the Mets’ chances before the team had a chance to hit. While I doubt he wants that to be his last outing in the big leagues, he has almost certainly thrown his last pitch in a Mets uniform.
I won’t suggest that Glavine didn’t care or didn’t try, having already won his 300th victory. He’s too much the consummate professional for that; even if he didn’t particularly care about winning, there were those that did, and I don’t think Glavine would deny them their chance. Furthermore, in the seven starts immediately following his 300th win, he went 3-0 with a 2.54 ERA over 46 innings, arguably his best stretch of the season. What I think actually happened that fateful September afternoon was simple: he was tired. He had been pitching poorly for a month at that point and, at 41, just didn’t have much left in the tank so late in the season.
With Glavine probably on his way out of New York, it seems as good a time as any to look back at his career. And what a career it is, with 14 seasons of 200 or more innings, ten seasons with fifteen victories, and fifteen where he posted an ERA better than the league average. He’s earned a ticket to Cooperstown, and is 21st on the all-time wins list.
And you know what the most amazing thing of all is? He’s never seemed like he should be any good.
While Tom Glavine had decent stuff early in his career—a low 90’s fastball, a great circle changeup, and two solid breaking pitches he never used—as he’s gotten older he’s had to get by with much less than he used to have.
Josh Kalk has been doing a lot of phenomenal research with the PITCHf/x data currently available thanks to Major League Baseball. He’s spent a lot of time compiling the data into easy-to-read formats, such as player cards for every pitcher for whom there’s a sizeable chunk of data available (100 pitches). On these cards, you’ll find statistics about that pitchers pitches (like frequencies, average break, and average speed) and plots that show how much break he gets on his pitches. Tom Glavine’s card confirms what you can pretty much gather from watching any of Glavine’s outings. While it’s not perfect—at least a few of those slower sliders are really curveballs, and some of the faster ones are actually cutters—it does demonstrate a few fundamental truths about Glavine.
First, his pitches have no movement whatsoever. His fastball has little lateral break and not a lot of sink for an 85 mile-per-hour pitch. His changeup breaks almost identically. Second, he really doesn’t get a big difference in velocity from his fastball to his change. In all, the average difference is slightly less than seven miles-per-hour. Looking at a comparable pitcher, Jamie Moyer has roughly a 7.6 mile-per-hour difference. Finally, while Glavine may throw his breaking pitches more often than he used to, they’re still something of a last resort.
So what do we have? A 41-year-old pitcher who throws one of two pitches 92 percent of the time, and the only thing different about those two pitches, for the most part, is about seven digits on a radar gun. Of course, there are plenty of pitchers who succeed with sub-par stuff; they usually have outstanding control, some other means of missing bats (like a funky delivery), or extreme groundball rates.
Tom Glavine? He’s got none of these things. His control is good, but not great, his walk ratios over the course of his career being only ten percent below the league average. He doesn’t get strikeouts, posting above average ratios just twice in his career. In fact, given what we now know about Fielding Independent Pitching, Glavine becomes a huge anomaly: his strikeout-to-walk ratios are downright poor. In fact, of any pitcher who has won 200 games in the modern era, only three have worse ratios when compared to the league average: Wabash George Mullin, Joe Niekro, and Charlie Hough. The latter two make sense, being knuckleballers who didn’t always know where their pitches were going. Mullin wasn’t comparable to Glavine, either, being a fastball pitcher with a big curve in the early 1900’s. And none of those guys were ever as successful as Glavine.
He’s never gotten an extreme number of groundballs, either, despite not allowing too many homeruns. His career groundball-to-flyball ratio is 1.43, above average, but not tremendously so. In short, Glavine has had a career so far above and beyond what you could reasonably expect, it’s mind-boggling.
How has he done it? The easy answer is location. Since he doesn’t have top-notch stuff, and he doesn’t do a great job keeping batters off the basepaths, or do anything else good pitchers do, he must be doing something special with his location. That much is obvious. But I’m going to offer a second reason: timing.
Warren Spahn famously said, “Hitting is timing. Pitching is upsetting timing.” However, when I say timing, I don’t mean it that way, although I’m sure Glavine uses that seven mile-an-hour difference between his changeup and heater to as good effect as he can. No, Glavine upsets a team’s timing. Consider his career splits in various situations:
Split BA OBA SLG
Total .257 .318 .376
RISP .250 .355 .351
- - - .255 .303 .382
Men on .259 .339 .367
1 - - .271 .316 .385
- 2 - .250 .388 .370
- - 3 .266 .399 .359
1 2 - .234 .308 .339
1 - 3 .276 .327 .373
- 2 3 .240 .483 .330
1 2 3 .249 .272 .305
You’ll notice a few clear trends. When the bases are empty or there’s just a runner on first, Glavine is pretty stingy with the walk. He’ll give the hitter more to drive (as evidenced by higher slugging percentages), but he doesn’t like to give them a free pass to first. Second, when a runner is in scoring postion, Glavine reverts to damage control. If a base is open he’ll stay out of the strike zone and try to make the hitter chase. In these situations, Glavine avoids giving the hitter anything he can drive, likely by throwing fastballs out of the zone or changeups low and away. He’s always willing to give the hitter something, but he makes damn sure it’s something he can live with. In other words, he makes it exceedingly difficult for offenses to get into a rhythm.
And finally, and perhaps most impressively, Glavine is an incredible pitcher when the bases are loaded, limiting hitters to just a .577 OPS (and just a .305 slugging!). To put that into some perspective, only his former teammate, Greg Maddux—who’s nearly off the charts at .520—among recent pitchers is close to Glavine’s mark. Not Roger Clemens, nor Pedro Martinez, nor Randy Johnson, nor John Smoltz, nor anybody. Quite simply, if there’s a situation with the bases loaded and I need to get three outs, I’m taking Maddux, but Glavine’s my “Plan B.” Thumbing through historical splits since 1957, there are only two or three others I’d consider taking before him, too.
When the Mets first signed Glavine to a three-year, $35 million contract in November 2002, I was strongly against it. The Mets were signing a 37-year-old pitcher who had likely just finished the last great season of his career. He didn’t strike anyone out, his control was so-so, and there was no good reason for him to be doing what he was. And worst of all, he was a Brave. And you know what? Despite the fact that he ripped my heart out on the last day of the season, and despite the fact he never felt like a Met no matter how long he stuck around, I am sorry to see him go.
Tom Glavine is a truly unique pitcher in history. No pitcher has done so much with so many flaws, and we’ll probably never see another like him in a Mets uniform.
Notes and References
John Walsh of The Hardball Times made pitching plots for many major league pitchers using the PITCHf/x data, too. His results aren’t any different from Josh Kalk’s, but they might be easier to read for some. You can find Glavine’s on page two here.
Speaking of Josh Kalk and The Hardball Times, he just posted a new web tool that provides the location of every pitch, sorted by type and opposing batter, that a pitcher threw. For instance, you could look at the locations of all fastballs Glavine threw to Jimmy Rollins this season. I didn’t have time to really play around with it yet, but it’s neat and definitely relevant to the discussion at hand.
Alex is a raving lunatic whose work can be found regularly here at Mets Geek. He welcomes comments and criticisms at kingblackfish@yahoo.com.
Your situational splits were interesting. I realize it would be impossible to do in this article without expanding it to a full blown research article, but i would be curious to see how glavins splits compare to other pithers. You are basically making the argument that glavine is good because he is a “smart” pitcher, that is what i gathered by your meaning of timing. You’d think this strategy of giving stuff to drive with no one on, and pitching around wiht a runner on 3rd would be the norm throughout the league. Do other pitchers not follow this strategy?
Also how can we explain his superman ability with bases juiced. I’d imagine his sample size is pretty enormous hear but it still seems misterious that he would pitch so much better with bases juiced (a no walk situation) as with no one on (a no walk situation). If this superman ability somehow paned out i think it would be proof of the existance of “clutch,” some I think most geeks at the moment refute.
They say warren buffet is a 5 sigma event. In light of what glavine has done wit hso little, any statistical geeks out there wanna tell us where glavine rates on the sigma event scale.
A lot of future research to be done here. Sorry for the #### spelling/grammer.
Glavine has always been one of the most underrated overrated players in the game. What he has managed to accomplish with the stuff he had is truly mind boggling. I enjoyed having Glavine here the past few years, but I do wish Atlanta had given him a contract last year, I think overall Glavine cost us more than that final game last year and I think we were overall a lesser team as a result of it last year. I did think when we were making the playoffs that it would likely be worth it as his presence in the post season would be a significant boost (also expecting a well rested Glavine because of the last 2 weeks being a laugher at the time). But for the regular season I think he cost the Mets more than he helped them.
BTW, when I say that I am not saying he was a bad pitcher all year and not valuable, but the 300 win issue cost this team a number of games this year that we would not have lost with a comparable quality pitcher who wasn’t gunning for 300.
Very interesting article, Alex. And a useful way of looking at an unusual career. Thanks for writing it!
That’s absolutely the strategy other pitchers try to follow, or at least are told to. Glavine just executes it as well as anyone in the game. Unfortunately, I don’t have splits on all pitchers in all situtations — just with the bases loaded, no one on, RISP, and runners on. I can tell you that, in general, pitchers pitch better with no one on base than with runners on.
The opposing OBA numbers on Glavine’s splits aren’t that crazy. It’s really the slugging that’s unique. The fact that he really limits the batter’s ability to drive the ball with men on is a big key to his success, I feel. And if I had data for his pitch selection in those instances, I think you’d find the changeup away is the big secret, a pitch he can spot that’s very difficult for hitters to pull or drive to the opposite field.
Furthermore, in big spots, I think many would prefer a power arm on the mound, one who can get the K. I don’t think many would consider a soft-tossing changeup pitcher to be the better guy in the circumstance, but it just might be the superior strategy.
The sample size is as large as anybody’s considering the relative scarcity of the event (270 PA’s with the bases loaded). Given how well he pitches, I think the effect is real to some degree.
As for the difference between the first and the second, I think a lot has to do with expectations. If the bases are empty and you fail to get the batter out, it’s no big deal; you just go after the next one. When they’re juiced, it is a big deal.
Glavine’s a marathon-type pitcher. The reason he throws so many fastball and changeups, according to him, is because they’re so easy to throw, and you can save your energy to get the breaking pitches over when you really need them. I think the same principle is at work here: don’t treat every batter like a do-or-die situation, exhausting yourself for when it really is do-or-die.
Alex, thank you for the response. It is nice metsgeek provides like minded individuals with this forum for analysis.
It seems there are limitless avenues for research. How many PhDs are cruching these numbers. I suppose baseball analysis is somewhat of a useless research avenue in the real world. Disappointing.
And now it seems official that he will play for the Braves next year. A slap in the face to this club that let it’s season take a backseat to getting him 300 wins this year. I truely hope he explodes next year and goes out in flames with a 9 something ERA after a few games…